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I.

INTRODUCTION

In early June of 1989, Florida experienced a wave of accidental
shootings of children by children. In the eight days following the end
of the regular session of the state legislature, six incidents occurred
in which children who found loaded guns in the home accidentally shot
themselves or other children.' Three of these shootings were fatal. 2
The repetitiveness of the child-shooting scenarios might have
numbed the in-state news media into indifference. Instead, as the
number of shootings mounted, media interest grew. Newspapers that
previously reported the early shootings as second-section local-interest
stories3 reported the later shootings as front-page news. 4 Editorials, 5

*EditorsNote: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the
best student note submitted Spring 1990 semester.
1. See Tampa Tribune, June 12, 1989, at 1A, col. 1; see also id. June 11, 1989, at 1A, col.
1; id. June 9, 1989, at 1B, col. 2.
2. See Tampa Tribune, June 18, 1989, at 1B, col. 4; id. June 9, 1989, at 1B, col. 2.
3. See Tampa Tribune, June 7, 1989, at 7B, col. 3.
4. See Tampa Tribune, June 12, 1989, at 1A, col. 1.
5. See Miami Herald, June 16, 1989, at 28A, col. 1; Tampa Tribune, June 12, 1989, at 8A,
col. 1.
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cartoons,6 person-in-the-street interviews, 7 and radio talk shows 8 dealt
with the problem of children's access to loaded firearms. On the evening news, television stations played audiotapes of 911 calls from anguished children who had just shot playmates. 9 Calls for legislative
action abounded.1
The Florida Legislature had reason to be sensitive to gun control
issues. Two years earlier, the 1987 legislature received widespread
attention for an enactment that effectively would have allowed licensed
and unlicensed gun owners to carry firearms openly in public.,' Commentators accused the legislature of turning Florida into a latter-day
Dodge City where citizens could commonly carry sidearms on public
streets.1 2 Opposition to the enactment came not only from traditional
proponents of gun control, but from such potentially threatened entities as state and local law enforcement agencies, and the state tourist
industry.13 The legislature acted in special session to close the "Dodge
City Loophole" before it went into effect.' 4 However, the legislature's
willingness to promote the right to bear arms in the face of a clear
threat to public safety had been widely publicized.1 5Both the wisdom
and the dignity of the legislature had been impugned.
As the publicity surrounding the wave of child shootings in early
June of 1989 mounted, the legislature reacted. Five days after the
end of the regular legislative session, Representative Harry Jennings
asked Governor Martinez to include the former's gun-safety proposal
on the agenda of a special legislative session which Martinez was
considering calling in late June. 16 Martinez initially reacted unfavor-

6. See Miami Herald, June 20, 1989, at 12A, col. 3; Tampa Tribune, June 18, 1989, at 3C,
col. 3; Miami Herald, June 12, 1989, at 16A, col. 1; Tampa Tribune, June 12, 1989, at 8A, col. 3.
7. Tampa Tribune, June 13, 1989, at 4B, col. 2.
8. Id. at 1B, col. 5.
9. See Miami Herald, June 9, 1989, at 1A, col. 3 (both CBS and CNN carried portions of
Sean Smith's 911 call); Whited, Kids, Guns Are Invitation to Disaster, Miami Herald, June 8,
1989, at 1B, col. 1 (radio and TV stations echoed Sean Smith's 911 call after he shot his sister).
10. Whited, supra note 9; see also supra note 5.
11. Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: FloridaAdopts Uniform Regulationsfor the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 751, 789 (1987).
12. Volsky, With Reluctance, FloridaCloses Dodge City Loophole, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1987, § 4, at 5, col. 1. The author also received private correspondence from a Colombian who
had read about Florida's relaxed gun laws in the local newspaper, asking if Floridians were
trying to revive the old West. Letter from Maria Mercedes Criales to author (Aug. 23, 1989).
13. Volsky, supra note 12, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Miami Herald, June 9, 1989, at 1A, col. 3.
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ably. 17 However, as public pressure intensified, the governor reconsidered his position. On June 14, Martinez called a special session for
the following week, and announced that Representative Jennings's
gun-safety proposal would be on the agenda. 18 Martinez also announced
his support for Representative Jennings's proposal. 19
The gun-safety measure which Representative Jennings and others
introduced in the special session on June 19 was essentially the same
as one Representative Jennings introduced two years before. 20 That
bill languished in the 1989 legislature without proceeding to a final
vote. 21 In the political spotlight of the special session, however, relatively few legislators were willing to ignore or publicly oppose a savethe-children gun-safety bill.22 Competing measures were introduced in
the House23 and Senate.2 On June 20, the second day of the special
session, the legislature easily passed a gun-safety bill designated as
Senate Bill 18-B.2
Senate Bill 18-B created three new statutes and added two subsections to a previously existing statute. Section 1 of the bill created
Florida Statute section 790.173, a statement of legislative findings and
intent.2 The legislature found that too many children were accidentally

17. See id. June 10, 1989, at 8A, col. 1.
18. Tampa Tribune, June 15, 1989, at 1B, col. 3.
19.

Id.

20. Miami Herald, supra note 16, at 1A, col. 3.
21. Id.
22. See Tampa Tribune, June 16, 1989, at 2-South Bay, col. 3. Some legislators who voted
for the measure which the legislature approved publicly doubted the wisdom of enacting such
a law. Id.
23.

See JOURNALS OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL SESSION

"3", at 2-3 (June 19-20, 1989) (HB 1-B, HB 7-B, HB 14-B, HB 16-B).
24.

See JOURNAL OF THE FLORIDA SENATE, SPECIAL SESSION "B", at 1, 16 (June 19-20,

1989) (SB 1-B, SB 18-B).
25. See JOURNAL OF THE FLORIDA SENATE, SPECIAL SESSION '"", at 16 (June 19-20,
1989) (Senate passed SB 18-B 26-6); JOURNALS OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL SESSION "9B", at 24 (June 19-20, 1989) (House passed SB 18-B 71-39).

26. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534. § 1, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2740. The statute reads as
follows:
(1) The Legislature finds that a tragically large number of Florida children have
been accidentally killed or seriously injured by negligently stored firearms; that
placing firearms within the reach or easy access of children is irresponsible, encourages such accidents, and should be prohibited; and that legislative action is necessary to protect the safety of our children.
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that adult citizens of the state retain their
constitutional right to keep and bear firearms for hunting and sporting activities
and for defense of self, family, home, and business and as collectibles. Nothing in
this act shall be construed to reduce or limit any existing right to purchase and
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killed by negligently stored firearms, and that leaving firearms within
the reach or easy access of children promoted such accidents.Y The
legislature further concluded that it needed to act "to protect the
safety of our children."2 In its statement of intent, the legislature
reaffirmed the constitutional right to use firearms for sport and defense. The legislature rejected constructions of the bill that would
impinge on people's right to use firearms for legitimate purposes, or
to remain secure from unwarranted governmental intrusion in the
privacy of their homes. ".9
Section 2 of the bill created Florida Statute section 790.174, which
authorizes misdemeanor penalties for negligent domestic firearm storage that results in a minor's improper or threatening exhibition of the
firearm30 Section 4 created Florida Statute section 790.175, which
requires that merchants selling firearms post signs warning the public

own firearms, or to provide authority to any state or local agency to infringe upon
the privacy of any family, home, or business, except by lawful warrant.
FLA. STAT.

27.
28.
29.
30.
follows:

§ 790.173 (1989).

Id. § 790.173(1).
Id.
Id. § 790.173(2).
Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2740. The statute reads as

(1) A person who stores or leaves, on a premise under his control, a loaded
firearm, as defined in s. 790.001, and who knows or reasonably should know that
a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm without the lawful permission of the
minor's parent or the person having charge of the minor, or without the supervision
required by law, shall keep the firearm in a securely locked box or container or
in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure or shall secure
it with a trigger lock, except when he is carrying the firearm on his body or within
such close proximity thereto that he can retrieve and use it as easily and quickly
as if he carried it on his body.
(2) It is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s. 775.083, if a person violates subsection (1) by failing to store or leave
a firearm in the required manner and as a result thereof a minor gains access to
the firearm, without the lawful permission of the minor's parent or the person
having charge of the minor, and possesses or exhibits it, without the supervision
required by law:
(a) In a public place; or
(b) In a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner in violation of s. 790.10.
This subsection does not apply if the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an
unlawful entry by any person.
(3) As used in this act, the term "minor" means any person under the age of 16.
FLA. STAT.

§ 790.174 (1989).
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that storing or leaving firearms within the reach or easy access of
minors is against the law.31
Section 3, now codified as Florida Statutes sections 784.05(3) and
(4), contains the bill's most dramatic feature.3 2 This section of the bill
authorizes felony penalties for persons storing or leaving a loaded gun
within the reach or easy access of a minor who uses the gun to injure
or kill someone. 3 Florida thus became the first state to authorize
felony penalties for negligent firearm storage which results in personal

injury.3 The new statutes and subsections went into effect on October
1, 1989. 5
Florida's authorization of felony penalties for negligent gun storage
has attracted the attention of legislators from other states. By midFebruary of 1990, legislators from at least eleven other states had
introduced felony firearm storage bills in their legislatures36 Some
out-of-state legislators patterned their bills quite closely upon the
measure passed in Florida.3 7
Florida's felony firearm storage statute, section 784.05(3), is thus
likely to affect legal systems and gun owners both in Florida and

31. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2741. The statute reads as
follows:
(1) Upon the retail commercial sale or retail transfer of any firearm, the seller
or transferor shall deliver a written warning to the purchaser or transferee, which
warning states, in block letters not less than
inch in height:
"IT IS UNLAWFUL, AND PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT AND
FINE, FOR ANY ADULT TO STORE OR LEAVE A FIREARM IN ANY
PLACE WITHIN THE REACH OR EASY ACCESS OF A MINOR."
(2) Any retail or wholesale store, shop, or sales outlet which sells firearms must
conspicuously post at each purchase counter the following warning in block letters
not less than 1 inch in height:
"IT IS UNLAWFUL TO STORE OR LEAVE A FIREARM IN ANY PLACE
WITHIN THE REACH OR EASY ACCESS OF A MINOR."
(3) Any person or business knowingly violating a requirement to provide warning
under this section commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(4) As used in this act, the term 'minor" means any person under the age of 16.
FLA. STAT. § 790.175 (1989) (emphasis in the original).
32. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 3, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2740-41. See infra text
following note 37.
33. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 3, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2740-41. See FLA. STAT.
§ 784.05(3) (1989).
34. Miami Herald, June 22, 1989, at 22A, col. 1.
35. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 8, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2742.
36. Conversation with a representative of Handgun Control, Inc., a Washington-based lobbying organization (Feb. 13, 1990).
37. Id.
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across the nation. To -predict the extent of that impact, this paper
will examine the mechanics of subsection (3) to determine how it
functions; evaluate the facial vulnerability of subsection (3) to constitutional attacks; and evaluate the extent to which subsection (3) is likely
to achieve the legislative goal of protecting the safety of children.
II.

How

FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION

784.05(3)

FUNCTIONS

Section 3 of Senate Bill 18-B provides for felony penalties for negligent gun storage by adding two new subsections to the previously
existing culpable negligence statute, Florida Statute section 784.05.8
Under Florida Statute section 784.05(3), felony liability may result if
a person stores or leaves a loaded firearm within the reach or easy
access of a minor, thereby through culpable negligence exposing
another person to personal injury.3 9 Additionally, the minor must ob-

38.

The current text of the statute is:
784.05 Culpable negligence
(1) Whoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another person to personal
injury commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) Whoever, through culpable negligence, inflicts actual personal injury on
another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or 775.083.
(3) Whoever violates subsection (1) by storing or leaving a loaded firearm within
the reach or easy access of a minor commits, if the minor obtains the firearm and
uses it to inflict injury or death upon himself or any other person, a felony of the
third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(a) If the firearm was stored or left in a securely locked box or container or in
a location which a reasonable person would have believed to be secure, or was
securely locked with a trigger lock;
(b) If the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful entry by any
person;
(c) To injuries resulting from target or sport shooting accidents or hunting
accidents; or
(d) To members of the Armed Forces, National Guard, or State Militia, or to
police or other law enforcement officers, with respect to firearm possession by a
minor which occurs during or incidental to the performance of their official duties.
When any minor child is accidentally shot by another family member, no arrest
shall be made pursuant to this subsection prior to 7 days after the date of the
shooting. With respect to any parent or guardian of any deceased minor, the
investigating officers shall file all findings and evidence with the state attorney's
office with respect to violations of this subsection. The state attorney shall evaluate
such evidence and shall take such action as he or she deems appropriate under the
circumstances and may file an information against the appropriate parties.
(4) As used in this act, the term "minor" means any person under the age of 16.

FLA. STAT. § 784.05 (1989).

39.

Id.
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tain the negligently stored firearm by means other than illegal entry,
and use the firearm to inflict injury or death. 40 However, even where
these conditions are met, a person who negligently stores or leaves
a firearm is not necessarily subject to prosecution as a felon. The
statute does not apply if a violation occurs in a hunting or sport
shooting context, or is incidental to the performance of the official
duties of a police officer or member of the military. 41 Each element
of the felony is of uncertain scope.
A.

Storing or Leaving a Loaded Firearm

Felony liability only exists under Florida Statute section 784.05(3)
if the negligently stored firearm is loaded.- The statutory language
appears to exempt situations in which gun and ammunition are stored
side by side. However, if gun and ammunition are stored together in
a household where the parents know that their minor children are
able to load and use the gun, a judge could find that the statute applies
because the gun was constructively loaded. Merely removing the ammunition from a firearm may not protect the person in possession of
3
the firearm from prosecution under the statute.4
. What constitutes "storing or leaving" is also questionable. An early
test of the statute involved an accidental shooting with a gun that the
parents of a teenager had given him.-4 The grand jury did not return
a felony gun-storage indictment against the parents because the grand
jury felt that the "stores or leaves" language of the statute did not
apply to a gun owned and possessed by a child. 45 Courts and other
grand juries may not construe the statutory language so narrowly.
The application of the felony statute to people with guns on or in
close proximity to their persons is also unclear. Florida Statute section
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989). The Florida Statutes define "firearm" as "any weapon
(including a starter gun) which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm
muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun." FLA. STAT. § 790.001(6)
(1989).
43. State v. Ware, 253 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1971) (ruling that ease with which
gun may be loaded went to the issue of whether gun constituted firearm). While a court could
rule that a firearm stored with bullets is constructively loaded, such a ruling is unlikely. See
JOURNALS OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL SESSION "B", at 11
(June 20, 1989) (proposed amendment I to CS/HB 1-B, authorizing liability for negligent storage
or leaving of firearm "which is either loaded or unloaded and accompanied by its ammunition,"
voted down 76-33).
44. See Florida Times-Union, Oct. 28, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
45. Id.
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790.174, created by section 2 of Senate Bill 18-B, authorizes misdemeanor penalties for negligent gun storage if a minor procures the
gun and exhibits it publicly, carelessly, or threateningly.46 Under section 790.174, a person who knows that a minor is likely to gain access
to a loaded firearm can avoid liability by storing the gun where a
reasonable person would believe it to be secure, or by securing the
gun with a trigger lock or in a locked cabinet. 4 However, the obligation
to secure the gun does not exist when a person "is carrying the firearm
on his body or within such close proximity thereto that he can retrieve
and use it as easily and quickly as if he carried it on his body." 8 The
legislature presumably exempted people carrying guns on or near
their persons from safe-storage requirements precisely because a
reasonable person would believe a gun carried on or near the body
to be secure.
Florida Statute section 784.05(3) similarly states that a gun owner
can avoid felony penalties by storing the gun securely or locking the
trigger.4 9 Unlike the misdemeanor statute, however, the felony statute
does not specifically exempt those with guns on or near their persons
from the safe-storage requirement. If the courts rule that the safe-storage requirements of section 784.05(3) therefore apply to people carrying guns on or near their persons, anomalous results ensue. For example, the person whose loaded gun rests six inches away on the sofa
may be exempt from misdemeanor penalties because the gun is in a
location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure. Yet
the same person may be subject to felony penalties because the gun
is not in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be
secure.
The different mens reas of the felony and misdemeanor statutes
heighten the absurdity of the foregoing result. Misdemeanor gun storage occurs where the person in possession of the gun "knows or reasonably should know" that a minor is likely to procure the firearm without
a parent or guardian's permission. ° The statutory language implies a
negligence standard. 51 Felony gun storage, however, may be found

46. FLA. STAT. § 790.174(2") (1989).
47. Id. § 790.174(1).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 784.05(3)(a) (1989).
50. Id. § 790.174(1).
51. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32,
at 182 (5th ed. 1984). Florida's highest court has defined negligence as "doing under given
circumstances what a reasonable and prudent man should not ordinarily have done under such
circumstances, or . . . failing to do what under such circumstances a reasonable and prudent
man ordinarily would have done." Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., 46 So. 2d 173, 178 (Fla. 1950);
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only where there is culpable negligence, which is a higher standard
than simple negligence. 2 Thus, a court which rules that someone carrying a gun on or near their person is liable under section 784.05(3)
is implicitly ruling that behavior not punishable as negligence under
the misdemeanor statute is nevertheless punishable as culpable negligence under the felony statute.
To avoid such gross inconsistencies, courts could find that the "on
his body or within... close proximity" exemption of the misdemeanor
statute also applies to the felony statute.e However, this interpretation is also problematic. The legislature created section 790.174 and
section 784.05(3) in special session as part of one bill. A strong presumption therefore exists that because two different statutory sections
created by the bill have similar but different language, the differences
are both intentional and significant.M
Incorporating the "on his body" exemption from section 790.174
into section 784.05(3) would also undermine the legislature's stated
purpose in passing the gun-safety bill. Florida Statute section 790.173,
embodying the legislature's findings and intent in passing Senate Bill
18-B, states that "placing firearms within the reach or easy access of
children is irresponsible, encourages . . . accidents, and should be
prohibited. '' If the negligent storage of firearms encourages accidents
and requires statutory prohibition in general, why exempt the negligent securing of guns carried on or near the person? No legislative
finding supports such an exemption.
A further inconsistency between the misdemeanor and felony gunstorage statutes could create problems in determining the extent of
felony liability under section 784.05(3). Section 790.174 provides for
misdemeanor penalties only when a person negligently stores a firearm

see also Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 221-22, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926) (distinguishing between
simple and culpable negligence in civil actions and applying the higher standard to a criminal
case).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 67-108.
53. See In re Opinion to the Governor, 60 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1952) (holding that "in
respect to an act comprehending a whole subject matter no specific section will necessarily stand
alone; and ... where some other section or sections may be applicable to a specific section, all
must be considered and construed together, in order to ascertain legislative intent") (citation
omitted).
54. See Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 929 (Fla. 1978) (when Florida Constitution uses
'Judicial tribunal" in one section, "courts" and "administrative agencies" in others, differences
presumed to be intentional); Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Comp. Div. of Workers' Comp., 408
So. 2d 751, 753 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (the legislature's use of different terms in different sections
of a statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended).
55.

FLA. STAT. § 790.173(1) (1989).
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"on a premise under his control. '' 56 Section 784.05(3) contains no corresponding situs limitation. The legislative findings in Florida Statute
section 790.173(1) support the notion that the legislature did not intend
to restrict felony liability to only that negligence which occurs on a
premise under the control of the negligent party. The findings include
no implication that children are at greater or more frequent risk from
firearms which people negligently store on premises under their control
than from firearms which people negligently store elsewhere. Further,
the posted warning signs mandated under Florida Statute section
790.175 advise firearm buyers that it is illegal for an adult to store a
57
firearm "in any place" within the reach or easy access of a minor.
It is also doubtful that the legislature would have exempted sport
shooting and law enforcement from felony liability if the lawmakers
had intended felony penalties to apply only on premises under the
negligent party's control.
However, the wave of shootings that provoked the legislative action
did consist of incidents in which children obtained firearms that people
had stored in their homes. Furthermore, as with the "on his body"
question, failure to interpret section 790.174 in pari materia with section 784.05(3) produces anomalous results. A person leaving a firearm
within the easy access of a minor on a premise under another's control
would be exempt from misdemeanor punishment if the minor used the
gun to threaten someone. The same person may be subject to felony
punishment if the minor used the gun to injure someone. And, as with
the "on his body" question, the inconsistency of that result is
heightened by the differing mens reas for section 790.174 and section
784.05(3).
B.

Within the Reach or Easy Access of a Minor

Gun owners who wish to avoid liability under Florida Statute section 784.05(3) may face serious difficulties anticipating how courts will
interpret "within the reach or easy access of a minor. '" Subsection
784.05(3)(a) specifies three precautions which a person can take to
avoid felony liability for negligent gun storage. Felony liability does

56. Id. § 790.174(1).
57. Id. § 790.175(1)-(2).
58. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989). Florida Statute § 784.05(4) defines a minor as anyone
under the age of 16. Id. § 784.05(4). Although neither the statute nor the legislative history
indicates that "minor" refers to anything but chronological age, a court conceivably could rule
that a person leaving a loaded firearm within the reach of an adult with the mental age of a
child also may be punished as a felon if the action results in injury or death. Id. § 784.05(3).
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not exist if the firearm is "in a securely locked box," is "securely
locked with a trigger lock," or is stored or left "in a location which a
'59
reasonable person would have believed to be secure.
The role of the three subsection (3)(a) precautions in the statutory
scheme is unclear. Although the statute does not contain language of
exclusivity, a court could interpret the subsection to mean that the
only way to avoid felony liability is to take one of the three precautions.
Under this interpretation, failure to take a statutory precaution necessarily results in leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy
access of a minor. No third alternative exists.60 Alternatively, courts
may interpret the subsection (3)(a) precautions as mere defenses to a
charge of negligent gun storage. Under this interpretation, a person
who stores or leaves a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access
of a minor may nonetheless escape liability if the person performed
one of the statutory precautions. The precautions would be irrelevant
to situations in which a minor procures a loaded firearm that was not
stored or left within the minor's reach or easy access.
The courts' choice of interpretation may be especially relevant to
gun owners who do not regularly have children in their homes. A
childless adult who keeps a loaded, unlocked gun in the night table
next to the bed is susceptible to punishment as a felon if the courts
rule that the subsection (3)(a) precautions are the only means of escaping liability under the statute. A child's actual acquisition and use of
the gun would foreclose any argument that the gun was not within
the child's reach or easy access.
C.

Culpable Negligence

Under Florida Statute section 784.05(3) culpable negligence is the
mens rea that makes unsafe gun storage punishable as a felony61
Section 2 of Senate Bill 18-B, which authorizes felony penalties for
unsafe gun storage, is the only one of the bill's four sections that was
not codified as a separate statute.6 Rather, the legislature incorpo-

59. Id.; cf.FLA. STAT. § 790.001(16) (defining a "securely encased" firearm, in the context
of the Weapons and Firearms chapter, as one which is 'n a glove compartment, whether or
not locked; snapped in a holster; in a gun case, whether or not locked; in a zippered gun case;
or in a closed box or container which requires a lid or cover to be opened for access").
60. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3). The title of Senate Bill 18-B includes the phrase, "requiring
persons to keep firearms in a locked container, another reasonably secure manner, or secured
with a trigger lock under certain circumstances." Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, 1989 Fla.
Laws 2739 (emphasis added). The courts may consider the title as an aid to interpretation.
State ex rel. Szabo Food Servs. v. Dickinson, 286 So. 2d 529, 531 (Fla. 1973).
61. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(1) (1989).
62. Act of June 20, 1989, ch. 89-534, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2740.
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rated section 2 into previously existing Florida Statute section 784.05,
which authorizes misdemeanor penalties for culpable negligence leading to personal injury.63 The relation between new subsection (3) and
previously existing subsection (1) of Florida Statute section 784.05
creates substantial difficulty in predicting the kinds of behavior which
courts will find punishable as a felony.
Subsection (3) states, "Whoever violates subsection (1) by storing
or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor"
commits a third-degree felony if the minor uses the firearm to injure
or kill someone.- To violate subsection (1), a person must, "through
culpable negligence, [expose] another person to personal injury." Subsection (3) is thus open to two very different interpretations.
Under one interpretation of subsection (3), the phrase "by storing
or leaving a firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor" defines
culpably negligent behavior violative of subsection (1). Under this
theory, the state would complete the felony prosecution once it proved
that the defendant had stored or left a loaded firearm within the reach
or easy access of a minor who used the firearm to injure or kill
someone. Further proof that the firearm storage had been culpably
negligent would be unnecessary.
Alternatively, courts could rule that a prosecution under Florida
Statute section 784.05(3) requires separate proof that the defendant
violated both subsection (3) and subsection (1). Under this interpretation, storing or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy
access of a minor may or may not be culpably negligent. The statute
merely provides that when such storage or leaving is proven to be
culpably negligent, it is punishable as a third-degree felony.6 Choosing
between these two interpretations of the statute requires the courts
to decide whether storing or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach
or easy access of a minor is the type of behavior that Florida law
recognizes as inherently culpably negligent.
Florida's supreme court has long held that culpable negligence in
a criminal context is not equivalent to the negligence necessary to
sustain a tort claim. In the 1926 case of Cannon v. State,67 the defendant was charged with manslaughter by culpable negligence in a fatal
automobile accident.6 In charging the jury, the lower court defined

63.

FLA. STAT. § 784.05 (1989).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 784.05(3).
Id. § 784.05(1).
Id. § 784.05(3).
91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926).
Id. at 217-18, 107 So. at 362.
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culpable negligence as "'[t]he omission to do something which a reasonable, prudent, and cautious man would do, or the doing of something
which such a man would not do, under the circumstances of the particular case."' On appeal, the supreme court held that the lower
court's charge to the jury defined simple rather than culpable negli71
gence,70 and therefore constituted reversible error.
The court determined that culpable negligence equaled the quantum
of negligence necessary to sustain a punitive damages award in tort.2
In elaborating a standard for identifying culpably negligent behavior,
the court merely adopted its existing standard for determining when
punitive damages were appropriate:7
[t]he negligence complained of must be of "a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life, or
of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or
there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or
which shows such wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly
careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public,
or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is
equivalent to an intentional violation of them."
Florida's supreme court further refined its definition of culpable
negligence75 in Carraway v. Revel76 by distinguishing among simple,
gross, and culpable negligence.7 The court distinguished simple from
gross negligence according to the likelihood that injury would result
from the accused's conduct: "simple negligence is that course of conduct
which a reasonable and prudent man would know might possibly result
in injury to persons or property whereas gross negligence is that
course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know

69.

Id. at 221, 107 So. at 363.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 222-23, 107 So. at 364.
72. Id. at 221, 107 So. at 363.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Florida S. Ry. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 39, 11 So. 506, 513 (1892)).
75. Both the definition of culpable negligence elaborated in Cannon and the equivalence of
culpable negligence with punitive-damages negligence have become axioms of Florida's common
law. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 75 So. 2d 312, 313-14 (Fla. 1954); Williams v. State, 54 So. 2d
66, 67 (Fla. 1951); Pitts v. State, 132 Fla. 812, 813-14, 182 So. 234, 234-35 (1938); see also Como
Oil Co. v. O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985); Walter v. State, 157 Fla. 684, 684-85,
26 So. 2d 821, 821 (1946); Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 220, 191 So. 296, 298 (1939).
76. 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959).
77. Id. at 20-21.
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would probably and most likely result in injury to persons or prop78
erty."
As between gross and culpable negligence, the court found the
latter to be a subset of the former: "Gross negligence, while it may
be within the area of culpable negligence [sic], such fact by no means
proves that all gross negligence must be defined as culpable negligence. '79 The court explained that gross negligence does not rise to
the level of culpable negligence unless the act complained of exhibits
"such wanton and reckless indifference to the rights of others as to
be equivalent to an intentional violation of them. '"
To determine whether storing or leaving a loaded firearm within
the reach or easy access of a minor inevitably constitutes culpable
negligence, Cannon and Carraway require that two questions be
answered in the affirmative. First, is it invariably probable that such
storing or leaving will result in injury? An affirmative answer to this
question requires a finding that when a minor has access to a loaded
firearm, each of three events is overwhelmingly likely to occur: (1)
the minor will handle the firearm; (2) the handling will cause the
firearm to discharge; and (3) the discharge will result in personal
injury or death.81 If each of these three events in fact occurred with
nearly invariable frequency, the amount of bloodshed resulting from
negligent firearm storage would long ago have been perceived as a
social crisis.8 2
Further, an affirmative answer to the foregoing question would
require the courts to evaluate the likelihood of injury based solely on
the endangering actions, of the accused, with no consideration of the
circumstances within which those actions took place. In determining
whether the accused has been culpably negligent, Florida courts typically evaluate the factual context surrounding the accused's actions.8

78. Id. at 22-23 (quoting Bridges v. Speer, 79 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1955) (emphasis in the
original)).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Dowling Lumber Co. v. King, 62 Fla. 151, 160, 57 So. 337, 339 (1911)).
81. Where event X consists of acts (1), (2), and (3), the likelihood that X will occur equals
the likelihood that act (1) will occur times the likelihood that act (2) will occur times the likelihood
that act (3) will occur. Thus, if each act (1)-(3) is 90% likely to occur, X is approximately 73%
likely to occur.
82. See Miami Herald, June 19, 1989, at 1C, col. 2 (in 1988, only 8 Florida children were
accidentally shot to death by playmates).
83. See, e.g., Peel v. State, 291 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974) (manslaughter conviction
of defendant who was drinking and drove through stop sign at 40-50 m.p.h. overturned where
evidence indicated defendant not speeding, victim may have been on wrong side of road);
Walsingham v. State, 272 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973) (manslaughter conviction reversed
where defendant had been drinking, had rifle across lap in own bedroom, gun discharged, bullet
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For example, in Fowlkes v. State,84 the lower court found the driver
of a car involved in a fatal accident culpably negligent where the
evidence showed that the accident occurred at night, the accused was
driving under the influence of alcohol at an excessive rate of speed,
and there were no skid marks before the point of impact1 5 On appeal,
the court overturned the conviction because, absent further details
regarding the nature of the intersection, the lighting, the visibility
and maneuvers of the victim's vehicle, and possible deceleration or
evasive maneuvering by the defendant, the evidence supporting conviction was insufficient.8
Even if the courts conclude that injury is invariably probable when
minors have easy access to loaded firearms, that finding would simply
authorize penalties under a gross negligence standard.8 7 To reach culpable negligence, Cannon and Carraway would require the courts to
answer a second question in the affirmative: does storing or leaving
a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor invariably
display a wanton indifference to consequences equivalent to an intentional violation of the rights of the injured person? ss Florida case law
indicates that the answer to this question is probably negative.
Culpable negligence does not require proof of intent.8 9 Nevertheless, many Florida courts, without so stating, have ruled that the
presence or absence of a wanton indifference to consequences turns
on the existence of facts either consistent or incompatible with intent
to injure. 9° In Getsie v. State,91 the defendant playfully pointed a loaded

went through door and killed son; defendant loved decedent, was remorseful); Hamilton v. State,
152 So. 2d 793 (2d D.C.A.) (in finding culpable negligence, court considered not only driver's
excessive speed, but other factors including road signs posting decreasing speed limits, defendant's familiarity with road, visibility in accident area, and necessity that drivers traveling to
and from Everglades would use road), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1963).
84. 100 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1957).
85. Id. at 827-28.
86. Id. at 830.
87. See supra text accompanying note 78.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 80.
89. See supra text accompanying note 74.
90. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 318 So. 2d 502 (lst D.C.A. 1975) (manslaughter conviction
reversed where defendant on good terms with decedent, endangered himself as well as decedent,
showed immediate remorse), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1976); Weinstein v. State, 269
So. 2d 70 (1st D.C.A. 1972) (manslaughter conviction reversed where defendant grabbed rifle
during conflict, but gun discharged because firecracker exploded and defendant jerked), cert.
denied, 273 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1973); Sharp v. State, 120 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960)
(manslaughter conviction reversed where evidence indicated that defendant had no reason to
shoot victim).
91. 193 So. 2d 679 (4th D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1967).
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revolver at his wife, pulled the hammer back, and pulled the trigger
to release the hammer and rotate the cylinder.- The gun did not
discharge because the defendant placed his index finger on the hammer
to ease it down.93 After several such mock shootings, the defendant
failed to sufficiently impede the hammer and the gun discharged, killing the defendant's wife at close range.- On appeal, the court overturned the defendant's conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence.9 5 The court found the facts inconsistent with culpable negligence: the defendant loved his wife; there was no ill will or friction
at the time of the shooting; and after the shooting, the defendant
ministered to and tried to revive his wife.In Tuff v. State,97 a mother angered her son by refusing to let him
shoot off the family revolver on New Year's Eve.9 Mother and son
quarreled in the son's room, and the mother left the room.- The
mother stood in the hallway outside the son's room and continued to
speak to her son through the closed bedroom door, gesticulating with
the revolver in her hand. 1°° The revolver discharged. 0 The bullet
went through the door and struck the son in the head, killing him.' °2
On appeal, the court professed empathy with the mother,' °' but
nevertheless sustained her conviction for manslaughter by culpable
negligence.- °0 Primarily, the court recognized that the shooting oc05
curred in the context of an ongoing argument.
If culpable negligence were no more than a quantum of negligence,
the Tuff and Getsie decisions would be incongruous in relation to each
other. Surely a person gesticulating with a gun which accidentally
discharges and sends a fatal bullet through a closed door at an unseen
victim is less negligent than a person who points a gun at someone
at close range, repeatedly pulls the trigger, and depends on his ability
to impede the hammer to prevent the gun from firing. As these cases

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 681.
509 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 954.

100.
101.

Id.
Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See id. at 955.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 955.
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demonstrate, however, a wanton indifference to consequences requires
more than negligent behavior that creates a great and foreseeable risk
of injury. Many courts appear to emphasize the last clause of the
Cannon culpable negligence standard: "which is equivalent to an intentional violation of [others' rights]."'1 The existence of an ongoing dispute in Tuff and the absence of a dispute in Getsie neither amplify
nor diminish the inherent negligence of the defendants' actions. However, a dispute is consistent with intent to harm, and love and good
relations are incompatible with such an intent. The courts have thus
°
turned the "wanton indifference" question into one of quasi-intent.1 7
The case law indicates that the inherent negligence of the firearm
storage would not in itself establish a wanton indifference to consequences in the presence of facts incompatible with an intent to injure
the victim. Under the cases decided in accordance with the reasoning
of Tuff and Getsie, culpable negligence would exist only where facts
indicate ill will between the person storing the firearm and the victim.
Yet even if ill will is present, the courts may not find a wanton
indifference to consequences if the accused could not foresee that the
actual victim would be the person injured by the negligent storage.
The foregoing analysis suggests that Florida courts are extremely
unlikely to find that storing or leaving a firearm within the reach or
easy access of a minor constitutes per se culpable negligence. However,
that conclusion is by no means certain. The level of proof that Florida
courts have found sufficient to uphold lower-court holdings of guilt by
culpable negligence

-

or punitive-damage awards in tort -

has been

inconsistent.' ° Further, the Florida Supreme Court has itself developed an analysis which would support, by analogy, a finding that
storing or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of
a minor does constitute per se culpable negligence.
The defendant in Ingram v. Pettit09 drove a car that struck the
plaintiffs car from the rear while the plaintiffs car was stopped at a
well-lit intersection.11o A breathalyzer test showed that the defendant

106. Cannon, 91 Fla. at 221, 107 So. at 363; see supra text accompanying note 74.
107. See Charlton v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Florida courts...
have construed [culpable negligence] to emphasize culpability which rests on intentional, or

quasi-intentional, behavior").
108.

Compare Fort v. State, 91 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1956) (rejecting definition of culpable

negligence as wanton indifference to others' rights and defining culpable negligence as not acting
as a reasonable, prudent person-would act) with Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939)
(using both the standard articulated in Cannon and the standard ruled incorrect in Cannon to
define culpable negligence).
109. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976).
110. Id. at 923.
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was intoxicated at the time of the accident."' Except for conflicting
evidence about whether the defendant applied his brakes before impact, no evidence indicated that the defendant was driving erratically
or abnormally. " 2 The trial court awarded compensatory damages, but
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and removed
the issue of punitive damages from the jury."3 The district court
affirmed. 114
On appeal, the majority of the supreme court chose not to apply
the long-standing common-law rule that punitive damages could not
be awarded absent proof that the manner of operation of the car
(rather than the intoxication of the driver) demonstrated a wanton
indifference to consequences."15 Rather, the court spoke of the difficulty
of dividing negligence into degrees and asserted that legal categorizations should not "cloud the policies they were created to foster. Our
guide is not to be found in the grammar, but rather in the policy of
the state in regard to highway accidents.""16 The court concluded that
because the courts and legislature had a clearly articulated policy that
drunk drivers are a public menace and should be punished, "juries
may award punitive damages where voluntary intoxication is involved
in an automotive accident in Florida without regard to external proof
of carelessness or abnormal driving . . . . ,
By analogy, a court could rule that the legislature has not merely
developed, but codified in statute, a clearly articulated policy that
negligent gun storage is a menace to the safety of Florida's children
and is to be discouraged by punishment. Defendants who violate that
clearly articulated policy presumably could be found culpably negligent
without further proof of wanton indifference to consequences. Such a
policy-oriented approach to defining culpable negligence could support
a judicial finding that prosecutions under Florida Statute section
784.05(3) do not require separate proof of culpable negligence.
The terms of the statute itself provide further support for the
notion that, under Florida Statute section 784.05(3), storing or leaving
111.
112.

Id.
Id.

113.

Id.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 924. For an illustration of the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 65 So. 2d
303, 306 (Fla. 1953) (evidence of intoxication cannot make an act wanton and reckless which
was not otherwise so); accord Grantham v. State, 358 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978);
Murray v. State, 329 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
116. Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924.
117. Id. But see id. at 927 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) ("it is unnecessary and improvident
to cast aside a body of law which has evolved carefully through generations of legal thought
and decisions").
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a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor constitutes
per se culpable negligence. Subsection (3)(a) exempts from liability
firearm storage in a location that a reasonable person would believe
to be secure. 118 Storage that a reasonable person would believe to be
secure is by definition nonnegligent." 9 If prosecution under the statute
requires independent proof of culpable negligence, it was completely
superfluous for the legislature to include in the statute a specification
that felony liability does not extend to nonnegligent behavior.
If, on the other hand, the statute defines storing or leaving a
loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor as culpable
negligence, the exemption for storage in a location that a reasonable
person would believe to be secure is functional. A firearm stored in
a reasonably secure location may nonetheless turn out to be within
the easy access of a minor. Subsection (3)(a) would thus exempt from
felony penalties persons who might otherwise be liable. An interpretation which avoids a finding that the statute is partially superfluous
is preferable to one which does not. 2 0°
In summary, an application of traditional culpable negligence
analysis to Florida Statute section 784.05(3) would require independent
proof of culpable negligence in a prosecution for felony gun storage.
However, the internal logic of the statute indicates that the legislature
may have intended to define storing or leaving a loaded firearm within
the reach or easy access of a minor as per se culpable negligence under
subsection (3). Such a finding could be sustained by a policy-oriented
approach to culpable negligence such as the supreme court undertook
in Ingran.12 It is thus uncertain whether Florida courts will rule that
storing or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of
a minor is per se culpable negligence.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA STATUTE

SECTION 784.05(3)
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has formidable
22
obstacles to overcome. Statutes are presumptively constitutional.1
The courts must construe a statute so as to uphold it if any reasonable

118. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3)(a) (1989).
119. See supra note 51.
120. See Terrinoni v. Westward Ho!, 418 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) ("Statutory
language is not to be assumed superfluous; a statute must be construed so as to give meaning
to all words and phrases contained within that statute.").
121. See suprm note 117 and accompanying text.
122. Bonvento v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 194 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1967).
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basis for such a construction exists.' The courts should resolve every
reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality because unconstitutionality must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.124 If one clause of a
statute is invalid, the courts will preserve the rest of the statute as
long as the stricken clause is not integral to the operation of the
statute, and the legislature would likely have passed the enactment
creating the statute even if the stricken clause had not been included. Despite these procedural difficulties, the politics of gun control
virtually assures that the constitutionality of section 784.05(3) will be
challenged. From the anti-gun-control perspective, the right to bear
arms is at least as likely to be chipped away as swept away. Those
opposed to gun-control legislation are thus likely to regard any statute
that potentially restricts the manner in which private citizens may
hold and use firearms as a step toward rigid regulation regardless of
the relative inoffensiveness of the statute at issue. The terms of section
784.05(3) may expose the statute to constitutional challenges under
several different theories.
A.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Florida Statute section 784.05(3) subjects violators to felony punishment for injuries that proximately result from the actions of children,
rather than the actions of the violators themselves.126 Liability under
the statute requires no proof that the violator intended injury, or was
even aware of the possibility that injury might occur. Because of the
existence of an independent intervening cause, and because of the
statute's lack of intent and scienter requirements, opponents of felony
gun storage may wish to argue that felony punishment under the
statute is disproportionate to the offense, and therefore, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 127
However, such an argument would probably fail.
The party challenging the statute may argue that the punishment
is disproportionate to the offense because the quantum of evil inherent
in negligent gun storage is comparable to that of misdemeanors rather

123. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1968).
124. Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411, 413-14 (Fla. 1981), rev'd sub
nom. Dennis v. Okeechobee County, 491 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987).
125. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 1974).
126. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989).
127. See Eger v. State, 291 So. 2d 676, 677-78 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974) (constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable where legislative enactment provides
for punishment disproportionate to the offense); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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than felonies. Under Florida law, however, felony status does not
reflect the quantum of evil inherent in the crime.'2 Instead, crimes
are classified according to the type of punishment allowable under the
statute.1 2A crime that subjects the offender to more than a year in
state prison is a felony. 13 And because the severity of the punishment
may reflect legislative objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation as
well as retribution, 31 no direct correlation can be drawn between the
severity of the statutory penalties and any legislative evaluation of
the degree of evil inherent in the crime. Thus, the argument has little
likelihood of success.
Alternatively, the party challenging the statute could argue that
the punishment is disproportionate to the crime because the legislature
has authorized significantly harsher penalties for negligent gun storage
than for other crimes of similar character. However, courts generally
rule that the legislature has wide discretion to fix length of sentence. 3 2
Further, any attempt to identify crimes of similar character for purposes of comparison implicitly involves an evaluation of the quantum
of evil inherent in each crime. An argument alleging disproportion
between the severity of the punishment and the quantum of evil inherent in the crime is unlikely to succeed.1'3
The courts' freedom to interpret the statute in any reasonable way
which supports constitutionality3 further reduces the likelihood that
a court would find section 784.05(3) facially violative of the eighth
amendment. If the courts require separate proof of culpable negligence
as under Cannon and Carraway,'3 obtaining a conviction would require a prosecutor to show wanton indifference to consequences equivalent to an intentional violation of the injured person's rights. 36 As
discussed, wanton indifference to consequences may be established by
evidence consistent with intent to injure.1 7 Because other statutes

128.

See State v. Bailey, 360 So. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1978) (essentially felonious or nonfelonious

nature of a crime does not determine whether crime is felony or misdemeanor).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 775.08(1) (1989).
Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
See, e.g., Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 339, 17 So. 2d 521, 522 (1944) (legislature has

power to denounce any act as crime, fix grade of offense and provide for punishment); Edmond
v. State, 280 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973) (within broad constitutional range legislature
is free to provide more severe or cumulative punishments for particular crimes), rev'd sub nom.
State v. Kirkland, 322 So. 2d 480 (1975).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
134. Powell v. State, 345 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1977).
135. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying note 74.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
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authorize felony penalties for quasi-intentional infliction of injury, 13
felony penalties for negligent gun storage are consistent with the
penalties imposed in other cases where culpable negligence leads to
injury.
B.

Equal Protection

The first objective of a party wishing to challenge a statute as
facially violative of constitutional equal protection is to establish entitlement to a heightened standard of review. Florida Statute section
784.05(3) authorizes felony penalties for those who leave loaded fire-

arms, but not other equally dangerous instruments, within the reach
or easy access of a minor. 19 The statute thus disadvantages those who
keep or bear arms. A party challenging the statute as an equal protection violation may argue that because the individual's right to keep

and bear arms is guaranteed in the text of the United States Constitution,140 that right is fundamental. A fundamental right may not be
impinged upon by any statute unless it is narrowly tailored to promote
141
compelling state interests.
Such an argument would likely be unsuccessful for several reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has never held that the right to keep and
bear arms, although derived from the text of the Constitution,- is
fundamental for purposes of triggering strict scrutiny.143 In fact, the
Court has ruled that in the context of the second amendment, the

138. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1989) (culpably negligent manslaughter punishable as
second-degree felony); id. § 782.071(1) (reckless operation of vehicle resulting in death of human
being punishable as third-degree felony); id. § 827.04(1) (culpably negligent deprivation of necessities to child or infliction of injury to child which causes great bodily injury is punishable as
third-degree felony); see also [1955-1956] FLA. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 926, 926 (culpable
negligence sufficient for prosecution under Florida Statutes § 784.05 is equivalent to culpable
negligence required under Florida Statutes § 782.07).
139. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. If.
141. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.").
143. See United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 771 n.9 (8th Cir. 1971) (the right to bear
arms is not the type of fundamental right to which the compelling state interest standard
attaches), vacated, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972); but see Note, The Right to Bear Arms and Handgun
Prohibition:A FundamentalRights Analysis, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 296, 309-11 (1983) (proposing
that the courts find that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental for strict scrutiny
purposes).
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right to bear arms is collective rather than individual. 144 Therefore,
impingement upon the individual's right to keep and bear arms does
not violate a fundamental constitutional guarantee.
Alternatively, even if the courts recognize that the second amendment protects the individual's right to bear arms, the effect of section
784.05(3) may not justify a heightened standard of review. By its
terms, section 784.05(3) merely restricts the manner in which arms
may be kept. 145 A successful claim that the statute violates a fundamental right would require the party challenging the statute to demonstrate that the statute so restricts the manner of keeping firearms as
to be equivalent to an infringement of the right to bear arms. This
argument is also unlikely to succeed.
The Supreme Court's only major second amendment case is United
46 In Miller, 47 the Court upheld a federal statute
States v. Miller.1

requiring that persons transporting sawed-off shotguns in interstate
commerce both register the shotguns and have stamp-affixed written
orders for them.'4 The Court reasoned that the second amendment
does not guarantee the right to keep and bear weapons that have no
reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated
militia. 1
Even an extremely restrictive interpretation of section 784.05(3)
merely prevents people from keeping unlocked loaded guns ready for
immediate use. While such a prohibition might hamper the ability of
gun owners to defend themselves quickly against personal attacks,
the statute does not impede the public's ability to utilize arms for the
common defense. Because Miller interpreted the right to bear arms
as a means of preserving a well-regulated militia, restrictions that do
not adversely affect the preservation of a well-regulated militia are
unlikely to constitute second amendment violations. The multitude of

144. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (purpose of second amendment is to assure continuation and effectiveness of militias); United States v. Cruikshank, 92

U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (second amendment does not grant right to bear arms for lawful purpose,
but merely restricts powers of national government); see also Beschle, Reconsidering the Second
Amendment: ConstitutionalProtectionfor a Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 69, 74-75

(1986) (federal courts have consistently held that the second amendment protects the right of
a state to maintain an armed militia but does not guarantee any rights to individual). But see

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting people the right to keep and bear arms in their own defense).
145. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989).
146. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 247 (1983).
147. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

148. Id.
149. Id. at 178.
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statutes at all levels of government restricting the sale, possession,
and use of firearms demonstrates the courts' reluctance to rule that
such restrictions reduce the right to bear arms under the second
amendment to a functional nullity.-5
If the party challenging section 784.05(3) cannot obtain heightened
review, that party must proceed to argue that the statute violates
the equal protection clause by creating classifications which have no
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.151 The traditional
methods of framing this argument are to aver that the statute is
overinclusive, exposing more people to criminal liability than may be
justified by the legitimate state purpose; 52 and that the statute is
underinclusive, exposing some people to criminal liability and exempting others where no principled reason exists for distinguishing between
the two groups.'1
Section 784.05(3) may be overinclusive since the statute applies
equally to all persons leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or
easy access of a minor regardless of the characteristics of the minor.
Subsection (3) authorizes felony liability for those who negligently
store firearms despite the existence of an intervening person who
proximately causes injury. The gun storer's liability in the absence of
complicity or willful cooperation in the injurious act is predicated on
the intervening minor's lack of responsibility for the actions producing
the injury.'- The minor's presumed lack of responsibility may be actual
in the case of a child too young or inexperienced to understand the
harm that may result from playing with a gun. However, if the minor
is a fifteen-year-old who has satisfactorily completed a gun-safety
course, the minor's presumed lack of responsibility for the consequences of firing a gun may be fictitious. Indeed, such a minor, under
sufficiently egregious circumstances, may be deemed responsible

150. See, e.g., id. (upholding federal law restricting conditions under which people may
own or transfer certain types of firearms); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,
271 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of village ordinance banning handgun possession
within village limits); FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (1989) (authorizing misdemeanor penalties for carrying
concealed weapons or firearms without a license).
151. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668
(1981).
152. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1023, 1074 n.263 (1979).
153. Developments in the Law, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1084 (1969).
154. See Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 386 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1980) (person who has
been negligent is not liable for damages suffered by another when some separate force or action
is an independent cause).
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enough to be tried for the shooting as an adult.'i In this case, subsection (3) could result in the felony conviction of the gun storer despite
the existence of a fully responsible intervening agent.,'
However, the courts have consistently ruled that a legislative classification is not fatally defective if imperfectly mated to the legislative
purpose.157 The validity test for a classification is whether it bears a
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.las In this case, the
legitimacy of the state's purpose of preventing injury to children is
virtually unassailable. And in light of the many statutes distinguishing
minors from adults on the basis of minors' presumed lack of mature
judgment, 159 a court is extremely unlikely to conclude that a statute
is facially overbroad for failing to distinguish between minors of different capacities.
A stronger equal protection challenge to section 784.05(3) could be
mounted based on the underinclusiveness of the statute. Subsection
(3) authorizes felony punishment for "whoever" contributes to a person's injury or death by negligently storing a firearm within a minor's
easy access.'0 Subsection (3)(c) then detracts from the scope of the
statute by exempting from felony liability individuals whose negligent
firearm storage leads to injury in the context of hunting or sport
shooting.'6 ' A party challenging the statute could argue that this
exemption creates a classification with no rational relation to the protection of children's safety.
In its statement of intent, the legislature expresses its desire "that
adult citizens of the state retain their constitutional right to keep and
bear firearms for hunting and sporting activities and for defense of
self, family, home, and business and as collectibles."' The legislature
thus expressly intended that its authorization of felony penalties for
negligent firearm storage not be interpreted so as to chill any of the
traditional valid uses of firearms. Section 784.05(3) addresses the evil
of culpably negligent firearm storage, not hunting, sport shooting,
self-defense, or gun collecting.
155. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5) (1989).
156. See Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1981) (under Florida law, an
intervening criminal act by a third person usually breaks the chain of causation in negligence
cases since a person usually has no reason to foresee the criminal acts of another).
157. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
158. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976).
159. See, e.g. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (right of citizens 18 years of age or older to vote
shall not be abridged); FLA. STAT. § 748.06 (allowing minors 17 or older to donate blood without

parental consent); id. § 748.07 (removing disability of nonage from persons 18 or older).
160. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989).
161. Id. § 784.05(3)(c).
162. Id. § 790.173(2).
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The legislative finding that negligent firearm storage encourages
injury to children is not context-specific.16 Nevertheless, despite creating blanket felony liability for culpably negligent firearm storage, the
legislature carved out a context-specific exception. A party challenging
the statute could well argue that exempting negligent gun storers
from felony liability in the context of hunting and sport shooting is
not merely irrational in light of the legislative purpose, but antithetical
to that purpose.
Section 784.05(3) creates enhanced penalties6 for culpable negligence that exposes other people to personal injury when the negligent
act is storing or leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy
access of a minor. The legislature's stated purpose in creating those
enhanced penalties is deterrence - "to protect the safety of our children."16 Thus, the exemption from felony liability that the legislature
created in section 784.05(3) remains rational if enhanced penalties do
not prevent injuries to children in the context of hunting or sport
shooting. This would only be possible if negligent gun storage in the
context of hunting or sport shooting poses a significantly reduced risk
to children, or if enhanced penalties do not deter negligent gun storage
in the context of hunting or sport shooting. If principled arguments
do not exist in support of either position, the subsection (3)(c) exemption perpetuates the endangerment of children, thereby derogating
the legislature's declared purpose to protect children.
An argument based on underinclusiveness must overcome predictable obstacles. Courts consistently hold that legislative enactments
are not invalid simply because they attempt to eradicate some but not
all aspects of an evil.16 Administrative difficulty is one factor which
courts consider in determining whether a given statute, admittedly
underinclusive, nevertheless should be upheld as a valid exercise of
legislative discretion.167 In the case of section 784.05(3), the hunting

163. See id. § 790.173(1).
164. Compare FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3) (1989) (felony liability) with FLA. STAT. § 790.174(2)
(1989) (misdemeanor liability).
165. See FLA. STAT. § 790.173(1).
166. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (legislature must have latitude to
accommodate competing concerns that account for limitations on practical ability of state to
remedy every ill); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976) (statute not
unconstitutional merely because state could have furthered its purpose more artfully, directly,
or completely); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (equal protection clause does
not require choice between attacking every aspect of a problem and not attacking the problem
at all).
167. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590 (1979) (any
special rule which transit authority might adopt to screen safe-risk methadone users likely to
be less precise and more costly than rule actually used); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
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and sport-shooting exemption is difficult to justify based on administrative convenience. Hunters and sport shooters whose negligent gun
storage has led to injury are no more difficult to identify and prosecute
than people whose negligent gun storage occurs in other contexts. In
fact, because hunters and sport shooters are exposed to misdemeanor
liability under Florida Statute section 784.05(1),lr8 they face prosecution anyway. Certainly the level of the offense does not constitute a
significant administrative difficulty.
Courts may tolerate underinclusiveness by deferring to the legislature's discretion to experiment in tailoring new remedies to identified
evils. 169 Under this view, the state legislature serves as a laboratory
that should be encouraged to develop creative solutions to the evolving
panoply of social problems. Where the effectiveness of novel measures
is untested, the legislature is not obligated to attempt the complete
eradication of the identified evil. As Justice Douglas wrote for a unanimous Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical,17° "The legislature may
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting
the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
7
further than the invidious discrimination.''
As the first, and to date only, regulation in the United States
authorizing felony penalties for negligent firearm storage,' 72 section
784.05(3) may well qualify for judicial deference under the legislatureas-laboratory theory. However, courts will not extend such deference
blindly. If the court finds that the exemption from felony liability for
hunters and sport shooters bears no rational relation to the purpose
of the statute, the court should then determine whether it can excise
the hunter and sport-shooter exemption from section 784.05(3) without
thwarting the legislature's purpose in passing the subsection. '7

Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 349 (1949) ("It]he legislature cannot very well

be required to impose upon administrative agencies tasks which cannot be carried out or which
must be carried out on a large scale at a single stroke").
168. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(1) (1989).
169. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (state's vital interest in controlling
dangerous drugs supports decision to experiment with new techniques for control); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (a merit of the federal system is
the opportunity afforded to state legislatures to become a laboratory and experiment with trial
and procedural alternatives); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)
(state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques).
170. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
171. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
172. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 125.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Once a court determines that the statutory exemption bears no
rational relation to the legislative purpose, the court implicitly decides
that the subsection creating the exemption is not integral to operation
of the statute. To determine whether it may invalidate the offending
subsection without striking down the entire regulation, the court
should further examine whether the legislature would likely have
passed the regulation absent the subsection.
To resolve this issue, the court must first resolve the question of
whether the situs limitation in Florida Statute section 790.174(1)
applies to section 784.05(3). 174 If the court determines that the legislature intended to authorize felony penalties only where a person's negligent gun storage occurs "on a premise under his control,1' 75 subsections (c) and (d) of section 784.05(3) are superfluous. Those subsections
create exemptions for hunting, sport shooting, and police and military
work, none of which activities has any significant likelihood of being
carried out on a premise under the gun storer's control. If the court
finds subsections (c) and (d) superfluous, it will likely excise those
subsections unless further reason exists to strike down section
784.05(3) in its entirety.
If the court finds that the situs limitation of section 790.174(1)
should not be read into section 784.05(3), however, the acceptability
of subsection (c) is more difficult to decide. By focusing on the general
protective purpose of the statute, a court could decide that the legislature intended to create section 784.05(3) without a subsection antithetical to the protective purpose of the statute. Alternatively, the
court could find that because the legislature demonstrated a specific
intent to shield hunters and sport shooters from felony liability, the
legislature would not have passed the remainder of section 784.05(3)
in its present form had the legislators known that their intent to
exempt hunters and sport shooters would be frustrated. It is therefore
unclear whether a court, which found that the hunting and sport-shooting exemptions in subsection (c) were unreasonable in light of the
legislative purpose would strike down only subsection (c) or all of
subsection (3).
C.

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process demands that a law affecting life, liberty,
or property not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that
the means selected have a reasonable and substantial relation to a

174.
175.

See supra text accompamying notes 56-57.
FLA. STAT. § 790.174(1) (1989).
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legitimate state interest.176 As a criminal statute, Florida Statute section 784.05(3) clearly affects a liberty interest.' Accordingly, subsection (3) will be struck down as a due process violation if either the
enactment is an unreasonable means of achieving the legislative objective, or the objective itself is not legitimate.78
Safeguarding public health and welfare is among the primary functions of government. 79 The stated objective of section 784.05(3), "to
protect the safety of our children,"' w is, as indicated above,"" an unassailable goal. A successful challenge to the legitimacy of the state's
interest in passing section 784.05(3) would therefore require proving
that the legislature's stated objective was not its actual objective.
Such proof would entail a demonstration that the statutory means
promote an objective other than protecting children's safety..12 Proving
that the legislature had a hidden, illegitimate objective thus involves
demonstrating that the statutory means are not reasonably calculated
to serve the declared legislative end.
In order to serve as an effective deterrent, a criminal statute must
provide a disincentive to performing the prohibited act. If a statute
does not provide additional disincentives to those which otherwise
exist, the statute will not deter. People who live with and care for
children already have a strong incentive not to store guns carelessly
love and concern for the children. Critics of section 784.05(3) may
argue that felony penalties are an irrational deterrent to negligent
firearm storage because a desire to avoid a felony conviction provides
no greater inducement to exercise care than do love and concern for
children. is
176. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
177. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
178. Perry, Substantive Due ProcessRevisited: Reflections On (and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 422 (1976).
179. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ('t]he promotion of safety of persons
and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power").
180. FLA. STAT. § 790.173(1) (1989).
181. See supra text accompanying note 159.
182. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973) (section
of Food Stamp Act ruled unconstitutional where section did not promote nutritional, economic
goals declared by legislature, and evidence indicated that legislative intent was to deny hippies
access to food stamps); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (statute held unconstitutional
where it did not promote legislature's declared health objectives).
183. See Hiaasen, Gun Safety Takes Belated Place in Sun, Miami Herald, June 19, 1989,
at 1B, col. 1 ("[i]f the idea of your own child gasping in a pool of blood doesn't deter a gun
owner, the idea of six months in jail certainly won't"); Erbe, Keeping Guns Out of Kids' Hands,
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 23, 1989, at 18 (Marion Hammer, Executive Director of Unified
Florida Sportsmen, quoted as saying, "I don't believe that the threat of a prison term can be
more of a deterrent than the thought of the death or injury of your child . . ").
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Such an argument attacks the wisdom of the legislature in imposing
felony penalties for negligent firearm storage, but does not suggest a
hidden improper motive. The worst that can be said about the actual
legislative objective is that it was purely political rather than protective: the enactment was not motivated by an intention to protect
children, but rather by an intention to foster the impression that the
legislature acted to protect children in the face of widespread public
concern over children's access to loaded guns. 11 The existence of political motivations is not in itself likely to cause a court to hold that a
regulation is sufficiently arbitrary or discriminatory to constitute a
due process violation. s And in this case, the state can assert that
felony penalties are in fact reasonably calculated to deter negligent
firearm storage.
The argument that felony penalties provide no greater disincentive
to negligent firearm storage than those which already exist is based
on a questionable generalization about human nature - that people
are concerned less about the risk of conviction than they are about
the safety of children. The state may argue that it is eminently reasonable to presume the existence of a substantial class of people who are
motivated more by self-interest than by concern for others. Because
section 784.05(3) may effectively deter that class of people from storing
firearms negligently, it is a rational means of protecting the safety of
children.
A court will thus be unlikely to rule that imposing felony penalties
for negligent gun storage is an unreasonable means of protecting the
safety of children. The challenging party would therefore have great
difficulty demonstrating that the legislature's stated purpose in passing
section 784.05(3) was not its intended purpose. Because a court is
likely to find that section 784.05(3) employs reasonable means to effect
a legitimate purpose, a substantive due process challenge to subsection
(3) has little chance of success.
D.

ProceduralDue Process

The Supreme Court; has ruled that an essential element of due
process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution is that statutes authorizing penalties for proscribed conduct
must provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonably clear idea

184. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (statute
promoting economic interests of specific state industries upheld where evidence was debatable
that statute also promoted state's declared environmental objectives).
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of what conduct is proscribed. 1' The court has stated that vague
statutes deny due process in at least two ways. First, because vague
statutes do not provide reasonably clear notice of what behavior will
result in punishment, they deny individuals an opportunity to conform
their behavior to legal requirements. 11aFurther, "[a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and jurors
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."'
Courts do not overturn a statute for vagueness simply because a
statute lacks sufficient notice of punishable behavior. For instance, a
defendant is unlikely to successfully escape prosecution under a vague
statute if that defendant does not come to court with clean hands. In
United States v. Ragen,'8 the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a tax statute that permitted reasonable allowances for personal
services to be deducted from a corporation's gross income. 9° The defendant asserted that the term "reasonable allowances" did not provide
a sufficiently clear guide to conduct.' 91 The court found that the corporation's payments for services were not reasonable.192 Rather, the
court found that the purpose of the corporation's extremely high services payments was to avoid tax liability.'9 The court stated, "On no
construction can the statutory provisions here involved become a trap
for those who act in good faith. A mind intent upon willful evasion is
inconsistent with surprised innocence."' '
A court is thus likely to find that any vagueness inherent in Florida
Statute section 784.05(3) constitutes a due process violation to the
extent that the vagueness exposes "surprised innocence" to prosecution. If the court can reasonably construe section 784.05(3) such that

186.

See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963) (conviction under criminal

enactment which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is prohibited is a
violation of due process); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1961) (vague

statute may deprive defendant of liberty or property without due process of law).
187.

See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (laws must give person

of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act
accordingly); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (terms of penal statute

creating new offense must be sufficiently explicit to advise people of what conduct will make
them liable).
188.
189.
190.
191.

Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (emphasis in original).
314 U.S. 513 (1942).
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 522.

192. Id. at 524.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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the statute does not entrap those acting in good faith, the due process
challenge will likely fail. Evaluating the potential success of a "void
for vagueness" challenge thus requires identifying the ways in which
the statute is of uncertain application, and determining the probability
that the uncertainties will result in the prosecution of a person acting
in good faith.
The differences between Florida Statute section 790.174(1) and
section 784.05(3) expose two uncertainties regarding the scope of liability under the latter subsection. 195 If the court incorporates the restrictions in section 790.174(1) into section 784.05(3), the latter subsection does not apply to violations that occur outside a premise under
the gun storer's control, or where the firearm was kept on or near
the body. Although there is a reasonable argument that the court
should apply the section 790.174(1) restrictions equally to section
784.05(3), it is unlikely that the prosecution of surprised innocence
would result. The section 790.174(1) restrictions merely define circumstances in which those who negligently store firearms are
nevertheless exempt from criminal prosecution. A court is unlikely to
find that a person has acted with sufficiently good faith to warrant
the protection of the due process clause if that person has negligently
exposed others to risk under the assumption that the law would shield
him from prosecution.
A stronger basis for a due process challenge is the vagueness
regarding the role of culpable negligence in the statutory scheme. If
the courts follow the In¢gram v. Pettit'9 policy approach to culpable
negligence, a prosecution may be complete upon proof that the defendant stored or left a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access
of a minor who used the firearm to injure or kill someone. The only
defense to proof of such storage would be that the person storing the
firearm complied with one of the safety measures in subsection (3)(a).
The potentially "surprised innocent" under such a reading of section
784.05(3) would be, for example, the person who keeps a loaded gun
in the night stand. Many people presumably purchase firearms in
order to have maximum access to them in a moment of crisis. Yet
under section 784.05(3) these firearm storers are subject to felony
liability if minors gain easy access to the firearms, even if easy access
is unforeseeable.19

195. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 109-17.
197. See supra note 60. If the courts read the subsection (3)(a) precautions as positive
obligations, lack of foreseeability would not serve as a defense to a prosecution. Id.
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The person with the revolver in the night stand is thus in a predicament. That person knows how to avoid liability - purchase and use
a trigger lock or gun cabinet. The statute, however, leaves doubt as
to whether the person with the loaded gun in the night stand must
sacrifice some peace of mind to avoid felony liability. A statute that
exposes commonplace behavior to felony penalties should provide the
public with a clear idea of what behavior the statute proscribes. Failure
to do so may constitute a due process violation.'98
The courts may avoid prosecuting "surprised innocents" by construing the statute to require separate proof of culpable negligence as
under Cannon and Carraway.'9 For conviction under section 784.05(3)
this construction would require proof that the firearm had been stored
in such a way as to make injury not merely possible but likely.m
Conviction under section 784.05(3) would further require proof that
the person storing the firearm displayed wanton indifference to the
possibility of injury created by the gun storage. 201 Facts inconsistent

with an intent to injure would likely prevent conviction under this
construction. Therefore, gun storage would only be punishable where
the child's procurement and use of the gun to injure someone were
highly foreseeable, and the gun storer harbored ill will toward either
the child or a foreseeable victim.m Keeping a loaded firearm in the
night stand would thus be punishable only under unusually egregious
circumstances. In light of the legislature's specific inclusion of its felony
firearms storage enactment under previously existing Florida Statute
section 784.05, a court could easily find that a statutory construction
requiring separate proof of culpable negligence was sufficiently reasonable to justify upholding the statute against a procedural due process
challenge.

IV.

THE PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF FLORIDA STATUTE

SECTION 784.05(3)

Judicial interpretation will determine whether subsection (3) expands criminal liability to persons whom previously existing criminal
law left untouched. This result follows if the courts interpret Florida
Statute section 784.05(3) as authorizing felony penalties for those who
store or leave a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a
minor without further proof of culpable negligence. Under this in198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See
See
See
See
See

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 78.
supra text accompanying note 74.
supra text accompanying notes 81-107.
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terpretation, the mens rea required for felony liability is effectively
simple negligence. 203 Previously existing law only punished culpably
negligent behavior that exposed others to physical injury.- With the
lower mens rea requirement, subsection (3) will expand criminal liability to those whose gun storage is negligent but not culpably negligent.
As mentioned, this interpretation opens section 784.05(3) to serious
constitutional challenges. In addition, exposing the merely negligent
person to criminal liability fails to promote the safety of children. The
law categorizes an action or omission to act as negligent when the
offender ignores a risk despite consequences that are sufficiently grave
and apparent to cause a reasonably prudent person to modify his
behavior. 20 5 Negligence is tantamount to unwitting but blameworthy
endangerment, or culpable thoughtlessness. 2- However, criminal
penalties will only deter thoughtless firearm storage if the threat of
criminal liability either causes people to appreciate the magnitude of
a risk which they would not otherwise have perceived or appreciated,
or causes people to act as they would have acted if they had appreciated
the risk.
Section 784.05(3) operates on the latter principle. Subsection (3)
purports to foster a response to the risk inherent in leaving a loaded
gun within reach of a child by creating an additional risk of felony
conviction. The deterrent logic of the statute is, "If concern for the
safety of children, your loved ones, and yourself is not enough to make
you store your loaded firearm securely, maybe felony penalties will
be."
Subsection (3) is thus not designed to deter even the entire subgroup of negligent gun storers who are more concerned about avoiding
criminal penalties than about protecting other people's safety. 20 Because the negligent gun storer is himself a potential victim when a
minor discharges the gun, subsection (3) is designed to deter only
those whose desire to avoid criminal penalties is also greater than
their desire to avoid being shot and possibly killed. If the courts
interpret subsection (3) as not requiring separate proof of culpable
negligence, all thoughtless gun storage resulting in injury or death
will create felony liability. Persons will be liable as felons despite their
203. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. The only defense to a negligent storage
charge is evidence of nonnegligent behavior in conformity with FLA. STAT. § 784.05(3)(a) (1989).
204. FLA. STAT. § 784.05(l), (2) (1987).
205. See supra text accompanying note 69.
206. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7(a) (2d ed. 1986). If the gun storer
were aware of the risk his storage created, the storage would be reckless, not negligent. Id. §
3.7(f).
207.

See supra text following note 185.
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concern about injury to themselves and others. This reading of section
784.05(3) does not further the deterrence objective. Punishing those
individuals whom the statute cannot deter is irrelevant to the safety
of children.
Such punishment also fails to serve a retributive purpose. A common victim of negligent firearm storage is the child of the negligent
gun storer. The pain and remorse of the gun storer is likely to be
most acute among precisely those gun storers whom subsection (3) is
not designed to deter. Application of subsection (3) to such situations
would generally only exacerbate the pain and separation which a grieving family already suffers.
If the courts interpret section 784.05(3) to require separate proof
of culpable negligence, subsection (3) will continue to affect only persons previously liable under Florida Statute section 784.05(1). Subsection (3) will simply enhance the penalty for culpably negligent firearm
storage. The deterrent logic under this interpretation is, "If neither
the safety of others, your own safety, nor misdemeanor penalties is
enough to make you store your firearm securely, maybe felony penalties will be."
Under this interpretation, subsection (3) would be more resistant
to a vagueness challenge. However, it would deter only that fraction
of gun storers who would be moved to store firearms securely by the
threat of felony penalties, but not by concern for others, concern for
personal safety, or the threat of misdemeanor penalties. The extent
to which such a limited deterrent would promote the safety of children
is debatable.
The inherent difficulty with legislation regulating private gun storage is that gun storage is often motivated by feelings of vulnerability.
Images of personal attack abound in the news and entertainment
media, 208 exacerbating feelings of defenselessness even in the absence
of a statistical likelihood of attack. Additionally, too many people live
in areas where personal attack is a significant reality.
Fear of personal attack, whether statistically well founded or not,
will cause people to act to reduce their vulnerability. Presumably,
individuals who keep unlocked loaded guns ready for immediate use
are more willing to run the risk that those guns will fall into irresponsible hands than that they themselves will be defenseless. In a society

208. On a randomly selected day, the St. Petersburg Times reported a case of child abuse,
St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at 1A, col. 1, a double-murder and suicide, id. at 1B, col.
1, a rape-stabbing, id. at 1B, col. 4, and an aggravated assault and suicide, id. at 1B, col. 3,

advertised seven theatrical films dealing with personal attack, see id. at 4F, col. 4; and announced
14 noncable TV programs dealing with personal attacks, see id. at TV Dial, p. 16.
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where facsimile firearms are common children's playthings, it is inevitable that some children who find loaded guns will be interested by
them and eager to handle them.
Accordingly, a certain number of accidents is also inevitable. A
legislative enactment such as Senate Bill 18-B, which by its terms
imposes no positive obligations on the gun storer,m is thus unlikely
to have a significant impact on the incidence of negligent firearm
storage. Yet, even a stricter measure imposing an affirmative obligation to securely lock all loaded firearms when not in use would likely
result in widespread noncompliance. Attempts to regulate private behavior which do not address themselves to the fear at the root of that
behavior will not alter the behavior.
V.

CONCLUSION

Florida's passage of a felony firearm storage measure has been a
political success for the legislature. The passage of Senate Bill 18-B
abated the intense media focus on the problem of children's access to
loaded firearms. An object of widespread criticism for its insensitivity
to the public safety two years before, the Florida legislature has
enacted a gun-safety measure which has been approved and emulated
nationwide. Other state legislators considering enactments modeled
after Florida's are unlikely to discount the political effectiveness of
felony firearm storage in Florida.
However, before emulating Florida's regulations too closely, other
state legislators should consider both the process by which Senate Bill
18-B was enacted and the quality of the legislative product. Senate
Bill 18-B was proposed, considered, and passed in a day and a half
under intense media and political pressure by a legislature historically
opposed to gun control but eager to restore its wounded dignity. It
is not surprising that the resulting legislation is inconsistent, unfocused, and of questionable deterrent value. At best, Florida Statute
section 784.05(3) will be a largely ignored subsection used primarily
to punish egregious recklessness. At worst, the subsection will exacerbate the pain and familial separation that generally result from accidental shootings of children by children. In neither case is section 784.05(3)
likely to substantially reduce the frequency of such accidents. Johnny
will continue to get your gun 10 until there are far fewer guns available
for Johnny to get.
Edward Licitra
209. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 823.07(2) (1989) (providing for criminal penalties against people who
discard such appliances as refrigerators and clothes dryers without first removing the doors).
210. See Miami Herald, June 19, 1989, at 1C, col. 2 (in the typical child-shooting scenario,
the child who obtains and discharges the gun is a boy).
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